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Advancing human development:  Values, groups, power and conflict 
Séverine Deneulin1
 
Abstract 
The question of values is central to the human development and capability approach. Yet, the 
capability literature says little about where values come from, how they are shaped and change. 
Exploring the dynamics of value formation and change is critical to advancing human 
development, for different sets of values lead to different sets of policies, and hence different 
capability outcomes. The paper argues that the human development and capability approach needs 
to pay greater attention to the different groups which construct the value frameworks from which 
people derive their values. This requires a more critical analysis of the power dynamics between 
groups. The paper proposes some analytical tools to examine the dynamics of value formation and 
its influence on policy. It concludes by discussing some ways in which the kinds of values which 
are necessary for advancing human development can be nurtured. 
 
Introduction 
In one of my first doctoral supervision meetings with Frances, there was a recurring 
comment pencilled throughout my abstract philosophical discussions on the capability 
approach: ‘What does this mean for the real world?’. During subsequent doctoral 
supervisions, there were three points that she often emphasised. First, humans are not free 
individual agents who decide and act on the basis of their own reasoning. They are 
profoundly social and embedded into layers of complex social relationships. Human actions 
are never disconnected from the wider networks of social relations and institutions in which 
people are historically situated. In other words, human existence is one of belonging and this 
provides the condition for the exercise of freedom and agency. Another point that Frances 
was always quick to point out was that policy decisions were the results of power between 
different groups, whether political parties, social movements, international organizations, 
civil society organizations, global corporations, companies or business associations. A final 
point, linked to the latter, which she ensured was not neglected, was conflict. When one 
makes an individual decision about one’s life, there are often equally valuable claims which 
are conflicting. This is even more the case when making collective decisions. Collective 
                                                 
1 University of Bath, UK. E-mail: s.deneulin@bath.ac.uk. I thank Judith Heyer, Nick Townsend and Peter Davis 
for helpful comments on an earlier draft. This is a paper which has been prepared for a conference in honour of 
Prof Frances Stewart, to take place in Oxford, 17-18 September 2009, and to be published in a Fetschrift. 
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decision-making is fraught with conflict whose resolution through reasoning is not always 
straightforward.  
This paper explores further these three points, and focuses on the analysis of the 
dynamics of value formation and its policy influence. It begins by discussing how values 
shape development policies and how the human development and capability approach 
conceives of the role of values in policy-making. The second section reviews some literature 
in psychology, sociology and philosophy, which offers some further insights into value 
formation and the policy influence of values. The third section puts forward some analytical 
tools that help better understand the dynamics of value change and its policy impact. It 
discusses especially the role of groups, which are the main drivers of value changes, and the 
power that these different groups command. It argues that policy change is often the result of 
conflict between groups which embed different value frameworks. The fourth section applies 
these analytical tools in the case of development policy-making in Costa Rica. The paper 
concludes by discussing the implications of taking into account groups, power and conflict in 
the formation of values for advancing human development. 
 
Values in human development 
Policies and values are inextricably linked. For example, slavery was abolished because some 
people came to endorse the value of equal dignity of all human beings, whatever the colour of 
their skin. Women were granted equal political, civil, economic and social rights with men 
because they refused to endorse the value of women’s subordination to men and adopted 
instead the value of equality. Labour rights were introduced because workers campaigned for 
society to recognize the value of labour and dignity of workers. A better understanding of 
why people endorse certain values rather than others (e.g. the value of respect for tradition 
and obedience to authority vs. the value of equality and respect to all regardless of sex or skin 
colour), and of the processes that lead to value change, is crucial for advancing human 
development. 
After decades of neglect due to the dominance of positivist economics on development 
economics and development policy,2 there has been a recent interest in exploring values and 
                                                 
2 The works of Amartya Sen and the capability approach have played a significant role in bringing the ethical 
dimensions of economics to the fore, and as a consequence, in bringing ethics and the question of values to the 
heart of development economics, and development policies. See Sen (1987) and Alkire and Deneulin (2009a). 
See also the work of pioneer development ethicist Denis Goulet in Goulet (1996) and Gasper (2008) 
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their influence on policy in development policy circles. In November 2008, the UK 
Department for International Development, in collaboration with the Foreign Office and the 
Ministry of Defence, organized a seminar entitled ‘Values 2020: How will changing values 
and beliefs in the UK and key regions influence development and foreign policy in 
practice?’.3 The motivation for the seminar was the growing awareness that policies were not 
likely to succeed if they did not rely on, or respond to, people’s values. Trying, for example, 
to make a country implement environmental policies while the majority of its population does 
not value environmental care, is bound to fail if people’s values are not changed to include 
protection of the environment as a central value guiding their lives. Or, as the democratization 
literature has shown, it is a difficult enterprise to maintain a democratic regime in a country 
where its inhabitants do not uphold values traditionally associated with democracy such as 
tolerance, equality, fairness, respect for others and the rule of law. A clear understanding of 
people’s values and how they change is thus essential for policies to succeed. 
The seminar discussions, summarized in the report, led to some interesting 
conclusions for the purpose of the argument of this paper. Values were widely regarded as 
relating to how people should live and behave. It was recognized that values were not static 
but constantly respond to influences and economic and social processes. These latter were 
termed ‘drivers of values’. The seminar identified several of them: global capitalism 
(materialism and conception of the good life linked to material wealth); environmentalism 
(shift in consumerism); class and inequality (one’s situation of the economy shapes one’s 
values in life); religion and secularism (religion may shape people’s values); ethnicity and 
identity (how one identifies oneself as belonging to a specific group); immigration and the 
diaspora (immigration may change the dominant values of a society, and may also change the 
values of immigrants’ countries of origin), and urbanization (cities change people’s values). 
In addition to recognizing values as being shaped by political, economic and social 
processes and vice-versa, a point that the seminar highlighted was that values were 
heterogeneous within societies, albeit with some degree of homogeneity. Speaking of British 
values or Muslim values in the aggregate as if every British or Muslim held the same values, 
masks a huge variety of views among the British or Muslim population. Yet, there is some 
relative homogeneity of values within a society so that one can state that there are values 
                                                 
3 The event was organized by the Overseas Development Institute. A seminar report, not for public circulation, 
was drafted by Bhavna Sharma of ODI. 
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which characterize British society, which are different from those which characterize, say, 
Nigeria or Japan.  
 That policy should rely on people’s values in order to succeed – the starting concern of 
the seminar discussed above – has been one of the core arguments of the human development 
and capability approach.4 In his version of the capability approach, Amartya Sen has left the 
question of which precise values development policy should be based on, open. It only 
affirms that policies have to be judged in the space of capabilities or freedoms.5 It falls short 
of specifying ‘valuable’ capabilities beyond saying that policy ought to promote the 
‘capabilities of persons to lead the kind of lives they value – and have reason to value’ (Sen, 
1999: 18). However, while not being specific about valuable capabilities, the ‘capabilities 
people have reason to choose and value’ are, or should be, in line with the values implicit in 
the universal human rights declaration (Sen, 2004).  
In her version of the capability approach, Martha Nussbaum has put the case for 
policies to promote an open-ended list of central human capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000). She 
entitles the second chapter of Women and Human Development ‘In Defense of Universal 
Values’. She argues that certain ‘very general values’ such as ‘the dignity of the person, the 
integrity of the body, basic political rights and liberties, basic economic opportunities and so 
forth’ (Nussbaum, 2000: 41) should be the universal norm to assess women’s lives – and 
development – worldwide. Her central human capabilities reflect these values.  
The secondary literature on the capability approach extends Sen and Nussbaum’s 
analysis of values. Qizilbash (2002) reviews the different conceptualisations of advantage in 
development (primary goods, incomes, resources, capabilities, needs, etc.), and observes that 
all these share common values such as concern with human beings and the quality of human 
lives, universality (every human being should be able to live a good human life) and 
component pluralism (a good human life cannot be reduced to one dimension). Following the 
work of philosopher James Griffin, Qizilbash favours a specification of advantage in terms of 
values, and not in terms of the objects of values which, he argues, capabilities are. So it is not 
the specific ‘capability to play’ or ‘capability to gain employment’ (cf. Nussbaum’s list) 
which should be promoted, but the value of ‘enjoyment’ or ‘accomplishment’ respectively, 
                                                 
4 For the links between the capability approach and human development, see Alkire (2008) and Alkire and 
Deneulin (2009b). 
5 ‘In the capability-based assessment of justice, individual claims are not to be assessed in terms of the resources 
or primary goods the persons respectively hold, but by the freedoms the actually enjoy to chose the lives that 
they have reason to value’ (Sen, 1992: 81). 
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contributions to which play or employment are only some specific instantiations. Capabilities 
are not values but ways in which more fundamental values are expressed. 
In her book Valuing Freedoms Alkire (2002) similarly makes a careful distinction 
between values and capabilities, in contrast to Nussbaum which equates capabilities with 
values. Alkire separates the exercise of valuing from capabilities. Values are what allow 
people to prioritize capabilities. They are what enable people to judge what is important in 
their lives and what dimension of human wellbeing is more worthwhile to pursue in given 
contexts.  
However, despite the centrality of values, the capability literature does not say much 
about the values which come into play during the valuation exercise. Alkire (2002) does not 
examine the reasons for which people value such dimensions of wellbeing and not others. In 
other words, she does not analyze the values, or value frameworks, which her respondents use 
in their value judgements. In the opening page of Valuing Freedoms, she writes that one of 
the beneficiaries of an Oxfam project in rural Pakistan ‘values the income the rose project 
produces’, and values the fact that her clothing smells nicely of roses and the inner peace that 
she derives from using the roses in religious ceremonies. Other respondents value the greater 
confidence that working in the rose project has given them.  
Alkire then proceeds to discuss what people exercise value judgements about and how 
they can make such value judgments. She argues that people should exercise a value 
judgement upon a set of dimensions of human development (such as life, health and safety, 
knowledge and aesthetic experience, friendship, work and play, self-integration, self-
expression and transcendence). She proposes a series of principles which may help people 
make value judgements about which freedom in what dimension matters most in their 
particular context.  
Thus, while emphasising the importance of values in development, what the human 
development and capability approach actually stresses is not as much values in themselves as 
the act of valuing, which it closely associates with the act of reasoning. Reasoning constitutes 
the core of democratic practice, a mechanism which Sen holds to be crucial in constructing 
people’s values, and determining policy decisions (Sen, 1999a, b). For example, the practice 
of democracy might construct the value of solidarity, which will then serve as a criterion for 
the democratic reasoning exercise about what policy priorities should be taken. This may lead 
to policy decisions which extend public health services or improve the quality of state-
provided education. Inversely, democratic practice may construct other values such as the 
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value of individual choice. This may lead to policy decisions which privatize public utilities 
and allow for greater private sector involvement in the health and education sectors. 
Despite stressing the importance of people’s values for development and policy (in 
terms of values shaping the reasoning process and outcomes), the human development and 
capability approach falls short of offering a detailed analysis of what values are, how they are 
formed and how they change. What values are used as criteria for value judgement? How 
come that certain countries use the value of ‘individual choice’ as criterion for policy 
decisions, while others use the value of ‘solidarity’? How come that at one point in time, a 
country might have made decisions according to the criterion of solidarity and has now 
changed it for individual choice? An examination of some literature in psychology, sociology 
and philosophy may help answer these questions.  
 
Values in the wider social sciences 
Social psychology provides a more precise conceptualisation of values than the human 
development and capability approach does. Values ‘are concepts or beliefs, pertain to 
desirable end-states or behaviours, transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation 
of behaviour and events, and are ordered by relative importance’ (Schwartz, 1992: 6).6  
From this definition, one can attribute two core characteristics to values: they refer to 
what is believed to be good (it is assumed here that something is desirable because it is 
thought to be good); and they guide human action. Research in social psychology has tried to 
identify which values guide people’s behaviours and has found that there are some which 
guide people’s actions universally, and that societies and individuals prioritize and express 
these universal values differently. On the basis of evidence from 20 countries, Schwartz 
(1992) singles out ten values which are universal but prioritized differently across societies 
and individuals: 1) self-direction (creativity, freedom, independence, curiosity, choosing one’s 
goals); 2) stimulation (seeking an exciting life, taking risks, seeking novelty); 3) Hedonism 
(pleasure and enjoyment in life); 4) achievement (seeking success, ambition and influence); 5) 
power (authority, wealth, social recognition); 6) security (social order, harmony, family 
security, national security); 7) conformity (obedience, self-discipline, politeness, honouring 
parents); 8) tradition (respect for symbols and practices that represent the shared experience of 
groups); 9) universalism (social justice, equality, peace, beauty, protecting the environment); 
                                                 
6 See Rohan (2000) for the various definitions of values in social psychology. 
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and 10) benevolence (honesty, helpfulness, forgiveness, loyalty, responsibility).7 A society 
may prioritize the values of ‘conformity’ and ‘tradition’ more than the value of ‘self-
direction’ but another society might have the inverse priority. Or an individual may prioritize 
the value of conformity in relation to his in-laws but prioritize the value of stimulation in his 
relation to his employer.  
One can object that the link between values and behaviour is not as straightforward as 
the above definition of values suggests. One might value honesty but behave in dishonest 
ways, e.g. by failing to pay a train fare because one knows that ticket controls will be very 
unlikely. Research in social psychology has widely documented the so-called ‘value-action 
gap’. On the basis of experimental research and review of the literature, Verplanken and 
Holland (2002) have concluded that there is a strong link between value and behaviour but 
that a value is more likely to influence behaviour: if it is central to the conception of self (one 
might say that one values honesty but one may not identify oneself as an honest person); if the 
specific case calls on the value of honesty (being honest in paying one’s train fare is not the 
same as being honest with one’s spouse); and if there are not many other values which come 
into consideration (one might lie to one’s children about the terminal disease of one’s spouse 
in order to protect them). 
Whereas psychology is more concerned with the individual than society, the discipline 
of sociology emphasises the role of social norms in the translation of values into behaviours. 
As in social psychology, values ‘define what is considered important, worthwhile and 
desirable’ (Giddens, 2004: 22), but sociology adds to this the importance of social norms, 
which are ‘the rules of behaviour which reflect or embody a culture’s values’ (Giddens, 2004: 
22). Giddens gives the contrasting examples of the values of achievement and hospitality. In 
some cultures, there are strong social norms which put pressure on people to be high 
professional achievers. Failing to be professionally successful might inflict on the person a 
sense of guilt, social disapproval or personal failure. Other cultures may have strong social 
norms regarding the values of hospitality and redistribution. Failing to honour guests 
adequately may result in a similar sense of guilt, social disapproval or personal failure.  
Structuration theory has shown (Giddens, 1984) that there is a two-way relationship 
between structures and social norms on the one hand, and individual agency on the other. 
Individuals act within the constraints of certain social norms and structures, but these norms 
                                                 
7 The value of spirituality (meaning and harmony through the transcendence of everyday reality) is a value which 
was found in some countries but not all the 20 countries studied by Schwartz. 
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and structures are themselves changed by people’s individual actions.8 For example, how 
Western societies value the institution of marriage has undergone radical changes over the last 
fifty years through the actions of individuals, such as those of feminist writers. A society’s 
values, and its corresponding enforcing social norms, are thus not unchangeable. As the next 
section will illustrate, there are individuals, and the groups they form, which are agents of 
change, and have the power to change a society’s core values. But why are values different 
across cultures, and why do they change? Some literature in political philosophy may give us 
some further insights. 
Like sociologists, some political philosophers have stressed the links between values 
and social practices (Raz, 1999, 2003) – what sociologists called social norms. For example, 
values such as ‘solidarity’ or ‘freedom’ would be meaningless without the shared social 
practices which sustain them (taxation, distribution of benefits, freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, etc.). Values are what the philosopher Charles Taylor (1995) calls 
‘irreducibly social goods’. They inhere in social relationships, whether in specific groups, 
such as the values which are sustained by the social practices of a family, trade union or a 
women’s institute group, or wider communities, such as the values which are sustained by the 
social practices of a religious community or by those bound by a common history or 
language. 
There are many groups from which people derive their values. One of the first groups 
that humans are born into is that of a family, which is itself moulded by many other groups. 
The child grows up endorsing the values embedded in the social practices which surround him 
or her – even the language that one learns is a social practice which contains certain values 
such as about gender relations and respect for elders and people in authority. The social 
practices of the family themselves may be influenced by other groups such as religious groups 
and their view of what constitutes a ‘family’. The child may also endorse the values of the 
education system which contains its own distinctive set of practices and values. In addition to 
schools, the media are also an important influence on people’s values. One can already 
foresee here that belonging to multiple groups or communities, with their respective ordering 
of values, may lead to situations of conflict between values. 
Unlike sociology, which limits itself to analysing the social influences on people’s 
values, philosophy addresses the issue of morality, and provides a discussion about the 
‘goodness’ of values, and whether some expressions of values are better than others. It 
                                                 
8 As Marx famously claimed ‘Men [sic] make their own history but not in circumstances of their own choosing.’ 
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analyzes e.g. whether societies should uphold the value ‘achievement’ more than that of 
‘solidarity’, or whether expressing the value of ‘achievement’ in terms of social status and 
competition is more, or less, desirable than expressing it through e.g. good craftsmanship. In 
other words, philosophy examines the moral claims which underpin a society’s core values 
and social norms.  
There are many ethical theories which each leads to different conclusions or answers 
to the question ‘What should one do?’ or ‘How should one live?’ (to name some major ethical 
theories: Kantian ethics, Aristotelian ethics, and utilitarianism). The same ethical or moral 
theory may also have different interpretations. What is perceived as ‘good’ is hence 
constantly debated across individuals and changing over time, and so are the values and social 
practices which support them. For example, architecture is a social practice which expresses a 
society’s aesthetic value and perception of beauty. What is of aesthetic value has obviously 
changed throughout the centuries because the idea of the good, in this case beauty, remains 
contested. Laws against the unfair treatment of women represent another social practice 
which has changed over time because society has come to understand equality in different 
ways following a change in the conception of what a ‘good life’ (for women) should be about. 
 These insights from psychology, sociology and philosophy – that values are connected 
to what people perceive as good, that there are universal values which societies and 
individuals prioritize differently, and that people draw their values from the various groups to 
which they belong – help us answer some questions that the human development and 
capability approach had left unanswered. It also helps us to understand better how values are 
formed and change. The next section examines further the dynamics of value change within 
the context of human development policy. 
 
Policy and the dynamics of value change 
Analysing the dynamics of value formation and change is central for advancing human 
development, for there are values which are more conducive to human development policies 
than others. For example, Kasser and Kanner (2004) document the negative impact of 
materialistic values on people’s wellbeing and human development. Nurturing the ‘right’ 
kinds of values, or at least ensuring that some values are prioritized instead of others, is 
therefore essential to promoting human flourishing. This section analyzes two core 
ingredients of the interaction between the dynamics of value change and policy: groups as 
‘drivers of values’ (what structuration theory referred to as the ‘agency/structure’ dynamics); 
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and the power that these groups command in society, what often leads to situations of 
conflict. 
 
Groups as ‘drivers of values’ 
In a study on group behaviour and development, Stewart (2002) examined the dynamic 
interaction between the macro-environment, groups and development thinking. She argued 
that the mode of functioning of groups, whether groups tend to operate on a ‘power/control’, 
‘quasi-market’ or ‘cooperative’ basis (Heyer, Thorp and Stewart, 2002), was greatly 
influenced by their social environment. Although she did not explore the extent to which 
groups in turn affect the macro-environment, her analysis gives us some insights.  
She alludes to the importance of ‘claims groups’9 in challenging prevailing social 
norms and the social order, and the distribution of assets in society, such as trade unions in 
19th century Europe or the suffragette movement. Other groups whose influence in shaping 
the macro-environment Stewart (2002) underlines are international financial institutions. She 
also notes that these groups have often been met with opposition and that the resulting social 
environment, and its characteristic norms and distribution of assets and benefits, is often the 
outcome of groups’ power struggles. 
She makes a similar argument in an article on ‘Groups and Capabilities’ (Stewart, 
2005) where she emphasizes the importance of groups in human development, not only in 
directly promoting human freedoms through collective action (such as credit union groups 
offering better economic opportunities to the marginalized) but also in shaping what people 
value. In that respect, she notes that some groups may shape people’s values in ways which 
might not be conducive to human development, e.g. groups which make people value respect 
for ‘national’ security over respect for human life, as in the case of some nationalistic groups.  
These groups can be seen as ‘drivers of values’, or agents of value change. To recall, 
the DFID seminar discussed in the first section included among these drivers of values: the 
global capitalist economic system, environmentalism, class, religion, ethnicity, and 
urbanization. But beyond these drivers of values are certain powerful groups. Global 
capitalism is a system sustained by groups of people, such as multi-national companies, 
international financial institutions and most fundamentally by academic groups which practise 
                                                 
9 Heyer et al. (2002) have attributed three functions to groups: 1) Overcoming market failures; 2) Claims 
functions, which ‘arise where one of the purposes of the group is to advance the claims of its members to power 
and/or resources’; and 3) Pro-bono functions, which ‘seek to alter the distribution of benefits within society, but 
[…] are directed mainly towards individuals outside the group […].’ (Heyer et al., 2002: 5-7). 
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a certain type of economic theory.10 Similarly environmentalism is driven by environmental 
groups, by ‘claims groups’, which are trying to confront other groups which sustain other 
values, such as the prioritization of economic profits over environmental care. Urbanization 
changes people’s values when they migrate to the cities, because cities are dominated by 
groups which uphold different values, or a different prioritization of values, than the dominant 
groups in rural areas. 
This analysis of groups as agents of value change has remained absent from the human 
development and capability approach literature so far. There is a lot of talk about democracy 
as an important space where people reason on the basis of their values and where values are 
constructed, but there is little on the many groups which inhabit the democratic space and 
which construct people’s values too, groups like religious communities, the education system, 
global corporations or the media. When Alkire (2002) mentioned that women in a Pakistani 
village valued the rose project because they could use them in religious ceremonies, she 
implicitly made the claim that religion was a significant source of values in people’s lives. 
The human development and capability approach would need a more careful analysis of the 
relational spaces which shape people’s values, and the groups which dominate them.  
In a critique of the individualism of the capability approach, Evans (2002) cites the 
empires of Coca-Cola and MTV as shaping people’s values and what they consider as 
‘valuable’. Sandel (2005) discusses how market practices and commercial pressures may 
corrupt civic institutions.11 When commercial advertising is used to finance education, it risks 
introducing a consumer attitude among students. Similarly for the health sector, seeing 
medication as a market product to boost companies’ profits damages people’s perception of 
health care as public good. When the logic of markets and marketing is introduced into 
democratic institutions, their underlining civic values might be under threat. As he puts it:  
When government leans too heavily on the borrowed appeal of cartoon characters and cutting-edge ads, it 
may boost its approval ratings but squander the dignity and authority of the public realm. And without a 
public realm in good repair, democratic citizens have little hope of directing the market forces and 
commercial pressures that quicken by the day and shape our lives in untold ways. (Sandel, 2005: 80)  
Thus, a value-based approach to development, which the human development and capability 
approach is, needs to include an analysis of the groups or communities which foster or nurture 
                                                 
10 For an analysis of how academic ideas, such as freedom as non-interference and other assumptions of neo-
classical economic theory, gain policy influence, see Alkire and Ritchie (2007). 
11 He also discusses this theme in his Reith Lectures on BBC radio in June 2009. The lectures can be listened at 
www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith/.
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certain kinds of values. But there is another point that has to be taken into consideration: that 
value change is often the result of conflict between conflicting groups. 
 
Power and conflict 
Changing the prevailing values in a given society is often confrontational, for it entails direct 
opposition to the dominant groups which promote, and have an interest in promoting, these 
values.12 Power – and its frequent consequence, conflict, whether overt or hidden – lies at the 
core of agency and structural change (Giddens, 1984; Lukes, 2005). The French Revolution 
and American Civil Rights movement are good examples of this. 
Eighteenth century France was characterized by a well-ordered society divided 
between the aristocracy and landless peasants. The prevailing values of French society at the 
time were that of respect for authority and tradition. These values were mainly promoted by 
two powerful groups which had an interest in maintaining that prioritization of values, the 
King and his entourage of aristocratic landlords, and the Catholic Church which had a strong 
association with the monarchy and aristocracy.13 The change towards a social order where the 
values of ‘solidarity, fraternity and liberty’ prevailed was accompanied by massive power 
struggles and conflicts.  
The civil rights movement in the United States is another example of this. The ‘good 
society’ as being one in which blacks and whites were segregated because of a God-given 
social order was being put in question by groups of blacks (and some whites). This entailed 
conflict between different groups with competing visions of the good society, and hence 
competing value systems or frameworks. One group privileged, referring to Schwartz’s 
typology of values, ‘tradition’ and ‘conformity’, the other privileged ‘universality’ and 
‘benevolence’. The values upon which policies were based in the United States in the 1970s 
were the direct outcomes of that power struggle between conflicting groups with competing 
value frameworks or value prioritization.  
Other countries which have known similar conflicts between groups with competing 
visions of the good society and values experienced less fortunate outcomes in terms of human 
development. Guatemala and El Salvador are two countries which have been engulfed in 
                                                 
12 For an analysis of how groups maintain inequality over time and exclude others from access to resources and 
opportunities, see Tilly (1998). 
13 For an analysis of such ‘dynamics of contention’ and the mechanisms through which groups are successful in 
changing the existing social order, including a detailed analysis of the French Revolution and the American Civil 
Rights movement, see McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001). 
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conflict between groups of landowners and landless farmers during the 1970s and 1980s, each 
one trying to impose their own values and vision of society. After nearly two decades of neo-
liberal policies in El Salvador, and a policy scene dominated by the landed elite and business 
class, the leader of the group which campaigned for land rights in the 1980s has recently come 
peacefully to power through democratic elections, signalling a probable change in the 
dominant values which underpin policy-making in El Salvador.14 Guatemala remains in 
contrast dominated by the whites and mestizos, leaving nearly half of its population 
marginalized and in conditions of acute poverty.15
The promotion of human freedoms is often not a peaceful enterprise. In a paper which 
provides a sociological reading of the capability approach, Feldman and Gellert (2006) write:  
The welfare states, which perhaps come closer to providing for the capability(ies) that Sen and 
Nussbaum advocate, did not emerge in the abstract world in which people decided to ‘assign 
responsibilities’ to institutions that promoted social welfare programmes (Nussbaum, 2004: 15). Rather, 
welfare states were historically produced in Western Europe and North America in the early decades of 
the twentieth century through struggle and negotiation by working-class and women’s movements. 
(Feldman and Gellert, 2006: 429)  
But value changes need not always be the result of violent conflict and power 
struggles. Conflict may be hidden. This is especially the case regarding changes in values 
brought about by capitalism and global markets. In the Challenge of Affluence, Avner Offer 
(2006) provides a history of the changes that a mass consumption society has brought about. 
He argues that affluence is driven by novelty, or in other words, that a consumerist capitalist 
system has made a priority of the value of ‘stimulation’ (to refer to Schwartz’s classification), 
leading people to want new things all the time. This constant search for novelty, made 
possible by expanding consumer choices, nurtures impatience, and impatience, Offer 
concludes, undermines human wellbeing (through, among others, increased addictions, levels 
of depression, family breakdowns and increased stress). He presses for the values of ‘service 
to others, sense of humility and proportion’ to replace those of ‘self-interest, power, 
dominance, status’ (Offer, 2006: 371). 
Consumerism is also changing people’s values in developing countries. Research 
conducted by the ESRC Wellbeing in Developing Countries group (WeD, 2007) reported that 
poor households in rural areas in Thailand favoured humility over attaining status through job 
achievement or consumption of goods, while households in urban areas favoured gaining 
                                                 
14 For an historical account of political power struggles in El Salvador, see Lauria-Santiago (2004). 
15 For a discussion of policy-making in Guatemala, see Sieder (2008). 
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status and adopting a high consumerist lifestyle. This conflict of values was very apparent 
when urban migrants came back to their villages. 
To sum up, the human development and capability approach needs to provide, in 
addition to an evaluative framework for states of affairs – the capability space, an analysis of 
the dynamics of value formation, of the different groups which shape these values, of the 
degree of power they command, and their consequent influence on policy. The next section 
examines the dynamics of group interaction, values and policies in the case of Costa Rica. 
 
Values and policies in Costa Rica 
Costa Rica has been known in development studies as a ‘human development success story’. 
The country has achieved high levels of human development, with education and health 
indicators similar to those of industrialized nations, despite relatively low economic resources 
(Mesa-Lago 2000). The policies that enabled these achievements did not emerge from a 
normative vacuum but rested on certain values that were the outcome of a certain 
configuration of groups and the power they had. This section discusses four distinctive 
periods in Costa Rica’s history in the light of the above analysis of the dynamics of value 
change, group interaction and policies.16  
A first set of policies that played a crucial role in Costa Rica’s development path was 
introduced at the end of the 19th century. In 1886, the Costa Rican Constitution declared 
primary education free and compulsory for both sexes, and sanctions were imposed on parents 
who did not comply. The impact of the policy was dramatic and illiteracy fell sharply. The 
government’s decision to promote universal primary education was motivated by two factors 
(Ameringer, 1982). First, the government endorsed the values of liberal capitalism and saw 
education as necessary to build a skilled workforce that would lead the country to a higher 
path of industrialization and economic development. Second, the government was committed 
to the values of secularism and a strong church-state separation. The banning of religious 
schools, which led to a state-control of the education system, was a means to protect 
education from the power of religion which was perceived as an enemy of reason and freedom 
of thought.  
The second significant period in explaining Costa Rica’s human development success 
was the 1940s decade. While the values of liberalism and secularism prevailed in late 19th 
century, or at least prevailed among the group which held political power, these values were 
                                                 
16 This section is drawn from material in Deneulin (2005, 2006). 
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tested after the First World War. The country experienced economic and social collapse due 
to the sharp fall of coffee prices, Costa Rica’s main export. Laissez-faire policies did not work 
to re-establish economic and social stability. A political party was created in the 1920s around 
the values of social democracy which prompted the government to undertake a range of social 
policies never conducted before, such as school meals. This path of social reforms took 
another turn with the election of Rafael Calderón Guardia in 1940. He introduced a social 
security scheme, which incorporated social insurance and social welfare programmes for the 
poorest. He also introduced other social guarantees, such as an eight-hour working day, a 
minimum wage, protection against arbitrary dismissal, and the right for workers to organize.  
The reasons for such policies were two-fold (Ameringer, 1982; Wilson, 1998). One 
lay in the person of Calderón himself. He was a paediatrician deeply inspired by his 
experience as a medical student in Belgium, where he encountered the Social Doctrine of the 
Catholic Church and as a doctor in the poor suburbs of San José. Another reason lies in the 
political context of the time and the group dynamics. A coalition between the Communist 
Party and the Catholic Church was able to overpower the elite opposition to the social 
reforms. (The context considerably changed after the Second World War where strong values 
of anti-communism characterized the Catholic Church.) 
A third decisive period was that of the post-war decades. Again the policies that Costa 
Rica took were strongly connected to the values that dominant groups held. In 1949, another 
President, José Figueres introduced compulsory secondary education, making both primary 
and secondary education free and state-financed. Food and clothing for poor students were 
provided by the state and adult education programmes were organized for those left out by the 
educational system. Figueres also introduced a law that allocated six per cent of GDP each 
year to public expenditures in education. He nationalized the banking system, abolished the 
army and imposed a wealth tax. These measures allowed the state to plan economic 
development, and they also led to a political weakening of the coffee elite. By weakening the 
power of the coffee elite, and building the ‘state entrepreneur’, Figueres determined the 
subsequent conditions for the economic and social development of the country (Ameringer, 
1982; Mesa-Lago, 2000). His party, the Partido de Liberación Nacional (PLN), became the 
majority party that Costa Ricans voted for during the entire post-war period. Among the 
policies implemented were education policies, which further improved child and adult 
education and increased rural educational coverage, and an expansion of the health system. A 
special health programme, involving a network of health centres and mobile clinics, was 
established for those living in rural areas. This emphasis on primary healthcare led to 
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significant improvement in health (Garnier et al. 1997). These policies relied on the core 
value of solidarity – that no-one should be in want – and on the belief that the state was the 
best keeper of this value – not private initiative. 
In these three key periods for human development policy in Costa Rica, a few ‘drivers 
of values’, and their constitutive groups, can be highlighted. There is the bourgeoisie and its 
values of secularism and liberalism. Those who held political power in Costa Rica in late 19th 
century were formed in that community. Religious communities can be another powerful 
‘driver of values’. There was the influence of religion on Calderón in his introduction of 
radical social reforms. One has to note however that religious communities are not 
homogenous and can form people in different values in time and space. For example, the 
Catholic Church of Costa Rica in the first half of the 20th century was ‘progressive’ and 
formed people in the values of solidarity with the poor and advancing labour rights. This was 
not the case in 19th century Costa Rica or in neighbouring Central American countries during 
most of the 20th century. In these countries, the Church was allied with the elite and the 
military and was promoting among the faithful the values of obedience to authority. 
The other influential Costa Rican President, José Figueres, was also formed by 
socialist groups. His biographer (Ameringer, 1978) reports that when Figueres went to study 
engineering in the United States, he did not attend lectures but instead spent his time in 
libraries reading about socialist theories of Charles Fourier and Saint-Simon. In addition to 
intellectual movements, political parties can be important places where the values necessary 
for advancing human development can be nurtured. The Partido de Liberación Nacional had 
a great role to play in shaping Costa Rican society around social democratic values. A 
political party, and its core values, can itself be influenced by other groups such as trade 
unions. Sanchez (2005) emphasizes that, in addition to the PLN, the trade unions of public 
sector employees were key in expanding the welfare state in Costa Rica. 
The fourth significant period for human development in Costa Rica was the decade of 
the 1980s, which saw a fragmentation of the democratic consensus around the value of state-
sponsored solidarity in favour of the value of freedom seen as non-state interference. The 
social democratic model underwent a profound crisis in 1980-2 due to the oil crisis and the 
subsequent rise in interest rates. The Costa Rican economy no longer benefited from low 
interest loans from international banks to finance its welfare institutions. Its external debt 
increased sharply, GDP per capita fell, unemployment doubled, inflation soared, real wages 
contracted, poverty increased. Drastic structural adjustment policies were needed to deal with 
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the crisis. The World Bank, and USAID, pressed the Costa Rican government to reduce its 
protectionism and increase the share of the private sector in the economy (Clark, 2001). 
The crisis of the 1980s introduced a structural change in the macro-environment from 
which individuals draw their values. This brought an ideological change inside the PLN’s 
own ranks, introducing a breach in the PLN’s long socio-democratic tradition. The PLN 
became a party which supported greater private sector participation in the economy and 
liberalization of markets. The banks which had been nationalized in the late 1940s were 
privatized in 2002. The pension and health systems have also been progressively privatized 
since the 1990s. These changes have had considerable consequences for human development 
outcomes. While Costa Ricans still enjoy a better quality of life than their other Latin 
American counterparts, inequality is rising at a worrying rate (Estado de la Nación, 2008).  
Rovira Mas (2004) talks about a ‘new style of development’, no longer based on the 
values of social democracy and solidarity but of market liberalism. He argues that this new 
style is the result of historic struggles between groups. Among them, he highlights the group 
of economists trained in neo-classical economics, the international financial institutions, and 
the Costa Rican political parties which have chosen to endorse the dominant values held by 
these groups. However, there are groups which are resisting the policies implemented by these 
dominant groups. The most striking example of this has been the popular protests throughout 
Costa Rica in 2000, formed by a coalition of trade unions, student organizations and many 
popular organizations, to prevent the privatization of the telecommunication company, which 
they saw as symbol of Costa Rica’s social democratic heritage. 
 
Conclusion 
In her analysis of groups in the capability approach, Stewart (2005) concluded that: ‘Given 
their importance in determining whether people lead good lives (i.e. adopt valuable 
capabilities) it is important to support groups that encourage valuable capabilities as against 
those that do the opposite. The implication of this, is that priority should be given to 
researching group capabilities from a conceptual, empirical and policy perspective’ (p. 199). 
This is what this paper has tried to do, to offer an analysis of the dynamics of value change 
and its impact on policy, within the context of the human development and capability 
approach. This requires careful attention to the groups from which individuals draw their 
values, and the respective power they command. This also includes acknowledging the reality 
of conflict as a positive force for social change. 
Today, consumerism or a capitalistic economic order based on mass consumption is 
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no doubt one of the major drivers of values shaping policies in the world; witness the lack of 
strong political action toward climate change, economic arguments seeming always to be 
more valued than environmental ones. But this observation does not lend itself to the fatalistic 
conclusion that nothing can be done about the power of unfettered global markets in shaping 
people’s lives and what they value. There are other groups which shape what people value in 
other directions. I have named religious groups as important groups where people are formed 
in certain values and which can counteract the dominant values carried by a global capitalist 
system. Trade unions, environmental groups, and political pressure groups can be other 
groups where other values can be nurtured. 
Advancing human development rests on a certain class of values. So far, writings on 
the human development and capability approach have neglected the importance of nurturing 
the kind of values which are conducive to human development and a more just social order. 
The paper has emphasized the key importance of the formative role of groups in shaping 
people’s values in certain ways. The Human Development and Capability Association, the 
Human Development Report Office, and universities which are teaching human development 
in their curriculum, can be such formative groups or communities in shaping people around 
the values that are necessary for promoting social justice and human flourishing. Whether 
these groups can challenge the power of other groups which promote values which are at odds 
with human flourishing – such as values related to a consumerism and materialism– is a 
matter of perseverance and hope.  
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